DER SPIEGEL: You spent months investigating the spying industry and the misuse of surveillance technology. What conclusions did you draw?

In’t Veld: The situation is serious. Our democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights are in great danger. We have a real European problem here.

DER SPIEGEL: In what way?

In’t Veld: The use and sale of digital spying tools is hardly controlled in Europe right now, at least not independently. We give governments and companies far too much power to spy on us. That’s really worrying.

DER SPIEGEL: But there are laws regulating the use of spying tools. In Germany, for example, such surveillance systems may only be used for serious offenses such as those committed by terrorists or serious criminals.

In’t Veld: In some European countries, however, these far-reaching surveillance techniques are also used when people feel threatened. If you’re a journalist in Greece and you report on corruption, that’s a threat to national security in the eyes of some. In Poland or Hungary, national security is considered compromised if an opposition politician polemicizes against the government. The term is completely vague; anything can be justified with it. Under this guise, governments or private individuals can simply spy away if they have the appropriate tools.

DER SPIEGEL: Surely the public would be outraged if that came to light?

In’t Veld: For the most part, the public doesn’t even find out that spying tools have been used. Governments often refuse to provide any information, pointing out that this information is subject to secrecy for reasons of national security.

DER SPIEGEL: But surveillance measures must be approved by the judiciary.

In’t Veld: In countries like Poland, the judiciary isn't independent. Judicial authorizations mean nothing there. And in countries like Greece, a special prosecutor is, to a certain extent, involved in the work of the intelligence services and are actually only supposed to give their nod to their requests. Thus, lawyers, politicians and journalists are systematically targeted. Moreover, the judiciary often has little idea of the technology being used and how it might be deployed. To assume that there is effective control of these tools in Europe is simply nonsense.

DER SPIEGEL: The German government also isn’t answering questions about whether it has purchased or used the Intellexa spy tool "Predator." Officials claim that providing an answer to that question could jeopardize the "welfare of the state."

In’t Veld: In principle, Germany is one of the countries that is more cautious about using these tools. But they have these systems just like many other European countries. And quite obviously, Berlin is also having a hard time being transparent on this issue.

DER SPIEGEL: Politicians, lawyers and journalists have already been spied on in Greece, Poland, Hungary and Spain. How could that have happened?

In’t Veld: Actually, in Europe, we do have laws regulating surveillance tools that are considered the gold standard worldwide. The issue is that they are not applied, because some governments have no interest in doing so. The concern about terrorists, about pedophiles, about organized crime – that is, about milieus that rely on encrypted and self-deleting communications to evade prosecution – has created a dilemma for many states. Governments say to surveillance companies, "We want and need this." And industry says, "OK, we’d love to, but in return, you don’t bother us if we want to export, no monitoring, please." It’s a deal from hell. It has global implications.

DER SPIEGEL: Because the surveillance industry can sell its digital spy weapons to rogue states this way?

In’t Veld: This issue is very unsavory and makes European governments uncomfortable. EU companies are supplying undemocratic governments with spy weapons. Europe has now become a real hotspot for the surveillance industry. Countries like the Netherlands, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Bulgaria and many other member states help spy on people around the world. They not only provide a home to the unfettered surveillance industry – they also support it with a reliable financial system and tax breaks. Europe is complicit.

DER SPIEGEL: Why are controls so ineffective?

In’t Veld: A few years ago, Europe passed a new regulation that also regulates the export of spy weapons. Do you know how the European Commission checks the implementation of this regulation? It asks a national government: "Are you applying the law correctly?" The government answers: "Of course we are applying the law correctly." Then the Commission says: "OK, great, thank you very much, here’s the bill. We’ll be back next year." There is no one who independently audits export laws. Governments audit themselves.

DER SPIEGEL: You interviewed many governments about the use of surveillance weapons for a parliamentary investigative committee. How did the cooperation with the EU member states go?

In’t Veld: There was no cooperation. Some were friendly and polite and served us coffee and cookies, but we never got meaningful answers. In the European Council (the EU body that represents the leaders of the member states), there was an icy silence on the issue, hardly any leaders criticized the misuse of the surveillance tools, neither publicly nor to us.

DER SPIEGEL: Your final report also lists several cases of European politicians who have become surveillance targets.

In’t Veld: The European Commission and some members of the European Council were targeted, but now prefer to keep quiet about it. I don’t understand this. This goes deep into the EU institutions and strikes at the heart of European democracy. How can you keep quiet about it?

DER SPIEGEL: Good question. What do you think?

In’t Veld: No one can point the finger at the other if everyone participates. Many government leaders know that some colleagues are using these surveillance weapons in a criminal way. But they also know that their agencies have these weapons themselves. And use them. So, they give each other their backing, hoping that nothing more will come out. It’s a kind of "omerta," as you know it from the mafia.

DER SPIEGEL: Sometimes, it’s difficult to accuse someone when definitive evidence is lacking. In Greece, the government denies to this day that it bought and used the "Predator" spy weapon.

In’t Veld: The scandal clearly bears Athens' fingerprints. President Kyriakos Mitsotakis secured power over the intelligence services shortly after his inauguration. He appointed his nephew as one of the most important officials. And then over 90 people were attacked with "Predator," including many politicians critical of Mitsotakis. Even in the absence of definitive proof, where is the European outcry? How did "Predator" get into Greece if the system wasn’t brought in by the government?

DER SPIEGEL: The companies in the Intellexa Alliance should be able to provide answers to these questions.

In’t Veld: You can see why these companies can feel so secure. They know things that could be dangerous to a number of governments. Moreover, while all sorts of states do business with these companies, no one really knows who owns them or who is responsible. The corporate structures resemble spider webs that expand and constantly change shape. This fact alone should deter any serious state from doing business with such companies.

DER SPIEGEL: You were able to reach Tal Dilian, the founder of Intellexa Alliance, which distributes "Predator."

In’t Veld: He tried to intimidate us and threatened us with lawyers. In vain.

DER SPIEGEL: Can this hydra-headed surveillance still be tamed?

In’t Veld: We urgently need a very narrow definition of "national security" in Europe and a strict regulatory and supervisory process. And we need to ensure that Europol is allowed to investigate as soon as there is a suspicion anywhere that these weapons of espionage have been misused.

DER SPIEGEL: That would be deep interference in national interests, and no member state has any interest in that.